Introduction
One of the major barriers to the successful implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle is the lack of a political will to intervene (Keating 2012) . While a considerable body of academic research has argued that public opinion is incredibly important for implementing an R2P policy (Bellamy 2012; Jentleson 2009 ), we have very little understanding of that factors that might influence general attitudes about humanitarian intervention. Political will is not only crucially important for responding to mass atrocities 2 but also to deter those atrocities from taking place in the first place. The ability of militarily capable states to credibly signal a willingness to intervene to stop mass atrocities is potentially a powerful mechanism to prevent mass atrocities. We investigate the relationship between public support for humanitarian intervention, credible signalling of political will and the potential to deter states from engaging in genocide.
The paper will be broken up into six sections. Section one discusses the previous literature on the importance of political will for the R2P agenda, specifically focussing on issues of representativeness. The second section extends this debate by integrating research into coercive diplomacy into R2P debates specifically highlighting the importance of domestic public opinion in maximising the credibility of threats to intervene. Having highlighted the importance of public opinion for R2P we then move onto the third section examining the underpinnings of support for humanitarian intervention, specifically examining the role of learning from previous conflicts and psychological predispositions that will influence public attitudes about the effectiveness and moral justification of using military force to protect civilians abroad. Section Four discusses research design, outlining both the dataset and the method used to investigate the underpinnings of public support for humanitarian intervention. Fifth, we discuss the results, focussing on the variables that influence public perceptions on the moral justification for intervention, the effectiveness of intervention and how they influence support for specific interventions. The sixth and final section considers the implications of the findings, highlighting areas that undermine public support and can adversely affect the political will for intervention.
Political Will
The lack of political will amongst decision-makers can be seen as one of the biggest impediments to successfully executing an R2P policy. One of the key factors undermining political will is resources, as military interventions are costly in both blood and treasure. When the costs are large and the national benefits are intangible we expect the elite would be less willing to intervene. Domestic and international contexts also impact on willingness to intervene; specifically Bellamy (2005) noted that the Iraq invasion reduced the willingness of elites to engage in foreign adventures, and has since noted that the 2011 intervention in Libya should be viewed as the exception rather than the norm (201, (1) (2) (3) . In other words, even if we now live in an era in which the primary question is how, rather than whether to act, political will remains a key component. An elite willingness to stop mass atrocities will be underpinned by public support for an R2P agenda. Public approval for intervention will be affected by a concern to do something about the mass atrocity and by a belief that an intervention will make a difference (Evans 2008, 224) .The clearest exposition of the importance of public opinion comes from Macfarlane et. al (2004) who argue that Òpublic opinion is crucial in generating the requisite national and international political will for humanitarian interventionsÓ (p. 988).
Without mass support for humanitarian intervention it will be difficult for decisionmakers to intervene in the first place and sustain support for that intervention over the longer period. Pattison (2007) discusses the link between representativeness and the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions. He argues that in order to be considered legitimate a humanitarian intervention needs to be both internally and externally representative. To be internally representative the state preparing to intervene needs to reflect the opinions of its citizens. To be externally representative the intervention needs to reflect the opinions of the political community that is going to be protected (Pattison 2007) . To be considered legitimate an intervention needs to represent both the views of the citizens of the intervening state and the views of the political community subject to that intervention. This paper addresses issues related to internal representativeness. It is worth noting in passing, however, that research examining external representativeness of humanitarian interventions is non-existent, representing an enormous gap in the R2P literature.
While recognising there are strong moral reasons for humanitarian interventions to be represent the populationÕs wishes, the major theoretical discussion of this piece relates to the role of public opinion in maximising the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention and the capacity to coerce human rights abusers in the international system.
Public Opinion, Coercive Diplomacy and R2P
Political will is affected by a variety of factors of which public opinion is one crucial dimension. Public opinion in democratic states is one of the most transparent characteristics behind elite calculations affecting their willingness to intervene and pay the costs of foreign military adventures. Manifest public support for intervention signals to human-rights abusers that a powerful liberal democracy has a domestic incentive to intervene (Davies 2012) . Conversely, a state whose citizens who are plainly predisposed against intervention will struggle to convince adversaries of its military resolve. Blending the coercive diplomacy literature with discussions relating to the effectiveness of R2P, it becomes clear why public attitudes towards humanitarian intervention are a potentially crucial consideration.
Coercive diplomacy is defined as negotiations backed up with a threat of force (George 1991) . A coercive diplomatic strategy is an alluring alternative to war, as it provides many of the benefits without the costs and risks associated with military conflict. The two dimensions to a successful coercive diplomatic strategy are firstly, a state has to have the capability to inflict unacceptable costs on a target and secondly the threat of unacceptable costs has to be credible (Davies 2012) . Credibility can often be garnered from interests, if the state clearly has strong interests in the region for geostrategic reasons then the threats are credible because they have either economic or security imperatives that need to be fulfilled. However, in cases of R2P, intervention is based around a normative agenda rather than strategic calculations, which in turn makes estimates of credibility less clear-cut. So while the United States and United Kingdom might have the capability to prevent an atrocity and punish those who had conducted it, their willingness to do so will very much be called into question. In the absence of geostrategic interests in the region, it is difficult for western policy-makers credibly to signal a willingness to intervene and punish those perpetrators of mass atrocities. There will always be a risk that the target believes the threat of intervention is a bluff.
A solution to the credibility problem can be derived in three ways. The first is through reputation. Establishing a reputation for carrying through commitments to intervene will make future threats credible (Sartori 2002; Guisinger and Smith 2002) . The second is through audience costs. This powerful way of demonstrating commitment is generated by a national leader making a high-profile speech that is heard by both the leaderÕs electorate and the international adversary (Fearon 1994) . In that speech the leader stakes his reputation on following through with the threat, thereby inflicting potential domestic political costs on himself if he fails subsequently to do so. While there is dispute about the extent to which publics react badly to inconsistency and perceived weakness as opposed simply to unpopular interventions (Levendusky and Horowitz 2012) , there is ample experimental evidence that unfulfilled threats have a cost in public approval (Tomz 2007; Davies and Johns 2013) , and thus that audience costs can generate credibility.
The third solution to the credibility problem is through a permissive domestic political environment in which the public actively support humanitarian interventions, punishing elites for not protecting humanity. Since the climate of public opinion in democracies is so transparent, it sends a signal to the perpetrators of mass atrocities about the likelihood that a western liberal democracy is bluffing rather than contemplating intervention. Applying insights from the literature on Strategic Conflict
Avoidance (SCA) we see that rival states become more cooperative towards the United States if they perceive that an unpopular US President has a domestic incentive to initiate an international dispute to divert attention from domestic problems (Fordham 2005) . It is highly likely that states considering perpetrating a mass atrocity will examine the international environment when deciding on a course of action. While there may be significant perceived benefits associated with widespread repression (as in the case of Syria), the perceived costs may be even greater if western democracies are expected to intervene and maybe even overthrow the regime. This reinforces the idea that perpetrators of mass atrocity crimes are not Ôpassive bystandersÕ but, in sharp contrast, interact with the changing international political environment (Bellamy, 2012) .
Moving from the general climate of opinion to consider attitudes towards specific military interventions, the role of public opinion is even clearer. If published polls indicate widespread support for intervention then the targets know that there is at least no electoral barrier to intervene and maybe a strong domestic political incentive to stop the atrocities. Regime transparency and a supportive domestic political environment for intervention can thus together provide a powerful tool for coercive diplomacy, especially in situations where threat credibility is very much in doubt, as is generally the case for an ethical rather than interests based foreign policy. Of course, the downside of the transparency argument is that, when public opinion is against intervention, threat credibility is much harder to achieve because potential targets of military strikes are well aware of the strong domestic forces ranged against an intervention.
Our case is therefore that public opinion within the potential intervener is potentially very important, not only for reasons of representativeness and legitimacy but also the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy in preventing or halting mass atrocities and sustaining an intervention when it takes place. The question then turns to those factors that might influence public opinion in this context. In the next section, we outline what research elsewhere suggests about the factors likely to shape public attitudes towards humanitarian interventions.
Attitudes towards Humanitarian
Intervention: Morality and Effectiveness. Herrmann et al. (1999) demonstrate that citizensÕ support for a given military engagement is based on a combination of their predispositions towards military action with information about the specific context. While recognising that any individual humanitarian crisis will have its own contextual features that shape public support for getting involved, we focus here on those more general predispositions towards humanitarian intervention. Support for an R2P policy is likely to be driven by two attitudes or predispositions in particular: i) is there a moral justification for such intervention? and ii) is such intervention generally effective?
The critical importance of moral justification for non-interests based interventions is obvious. If a citizen believes that there is no ethical basis for interfering in another stateÕs affairs, then she is unlikely to support a specific foreign involvement in cases like Syria or the Central African Republic. Perhaps slightly less obvious but also very important is a perception that humanitarian intervention will be effective Ð that is, succeed in its core goals (and without major negative side-effects). Jentleson (1992) used the phrase Ôpretty prudentÕ to characterise a US public whose decisions on military action
were driven more by a kind of cost-benefit analysis than by ethical commitments either to pacifism or interventionism. Likely success has been shown in numerous other studies to be a key predictor of support for war (Eichenberg 2005 ) and casualty tolerance (Gelpi et al. 2005-6) . Our first main research question, then, concerns the extent to which the British public assesses humanitarian intervention as generally i) an ethical and ii) an effective policy.
Of course, that raises a second question: what generates these assessments? Why is support at the level that it is, and why do different citizens sometimes come to differing conclusions about whether humanitarian action is justifiable and likely to succeed? In this article, we focus on two sets of factors that drive overall predispositions towards such intervention: learning from previous conflicts; and individual differences in personality variables.
Recent experiences of international conflicts will clearly influence public perceptions about both the morality and the effectiveness of humanitarian interventions.
In general the public have little knowledge about international affairs and they rely heavily on elite cues and heuristics based around previous involvements in international affairs. We noted earlier the likely impact of Iraq and Afghanistan on public reactions to future interventions (Bellamy 2008 (Altemeyer 1998) . While the two are generally associated with belligerence, things become more complicated in the specific case of humanitarian interventions.
The link between authoritarianism and support for war lies above all in the heightened sense of threat felt by those RWA (Winter 1996) . It has been argued that RWA stems from a harsh and overly-disciplinary childhood which engenders a view of the world as a threatening place where social conformity helps the individual reduce that threat (Duckitt 2001) . Altemeyer (1988 Altemeyer ( , 1998 found that there was a strong correlation between authoritarianism and the perception that the world is a dangerous and threatening place. Similarly, Lavine et al. (1999) While authoritarianism increases militarism through increased threat perception, Social Dominance is expected to increase support for war through a perception of superiority and lack of empathy about the human costs of military action (Duckitt 2001; Pratto et al. 1994 ). Pratto et. al (1994) defines social dominance orientation as Òthe extent that one desires that oneÕs in-group dominate and be superior to out-groupsÓ (p.742). Individuals with a high Social Dominance Orientation are concerned with hierarchy within societies and group dominance (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999) . They are power maximisers, tending to see the world as a Òcompetitive jungleÓ (Duckitt et al., 2002) , and as such tend to emphasise national dominance and to support wars that favour the national interest (Pratto et. al 1994) . SDOs are also unsentimental, the trait being strongly negatively correlated with empathy.
This leads to conflicting expectations about the justifiability of humanitarian intervention in the eyes of high SDOs. On the one hand, SDOs are not much inclined to question the justifiability of in-group actions, and might regard military action as a generally acceptable means of emphasising national dominance and superiority over outgroups. On the other hand, the humanitarian suffering that typically drives support for intervention will instead be regarded as an inevitable feature of that Ôcompetitive jungleÕ (McFarland 2005) and so SDOs may see little normative justification for action. Since it is hard to say which of those drivers will outweigh the other, we stick with a null hypothesis in the case of justifiability. With effectiveness, things seem more clear-cut:
SDO should be negatively associated with the belief that intervention will be able to eliminate humanitarian abuse.
H3a: There will be relationship between SDO and the belief that humanitarian intervention can be morally justified.
H3b: There will be a relationship between SDO and the belief that humanitarian intervention is effective.
Research Design and Data

Data
In this section, we discuss the data and survey measures used to address those hypotheses. Our data are taken from Waves 1 and 2 of an Economic and Social
Research Council (ESRC)-funded three-wave panel survey of the British publicÕs foreign policy attitudes. 3 The surveys were conducted over the internet by YouGov, using their 300,000 members as the sampling frame. Iran. In short, if these conflicts were prominent in respondentsÕ minds when answering our survey questions, this is not an artefact of survey timing but a consequence of their continuing prominence in British public discourse on military action.
Variables.
Dependent Variables: (not at all effective) to 7 (very effective), please say how effective you think the use of force would be in each of these situations: Preventing human rights abuses overseasÕ.
Independent Variables:
4 There are good reasons to be confident in the representativeness of the sample as YouGov has an impressive track record of data collection and weighting to achieve samples politically reflective of the British public. Most of the respondents are recruited (by targeted campaigns on non-political websites) rather than volunteering for the panel. Respondents are unable to select the surveys that they take part in, they are either sampled or not.
Success Afghanistan: How would you BritainÕs recent military actions in Afghanistan?
Please use a scale from 0 to 6 where 0 means a complete failure and 6 means complete success.
Success Iraq: How would you BritainÕs recent military actions in Afghanistan? Please use a scale from 0 to 6 where 0 means a complete failure and 6 means complete success.
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA):
The RWA measure is based on four questions (reverse-scored items are asterisked).
¥ People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences ¥ People in Britain should be more tolerant of those who lead unconventional lives* ¥ Young people today donÕt have enough respect for traditional British values.
¥ People should be allowed to organize public meetings to protest against the government*
The RWA items were taken from Evans, Heath and LalljeeÕs libertarian-authoritarian scale and have been extensively validated using British mass samples.
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO):
The SDO measure is based on four questions (reverse-scored items are asterisked). 
Results
Looking at Figure 1 , we see a clear difference between attitudes about justification and effectiveness. The public perceive that humanitarian interventions are morally justifiable but they question its effectiveness. This is crucially important if elites are trying to generate public support for an intervention. If the debate focuses on effectiveness of interventions then the government is unlikely to get much traction, but if the elite discuss the moral necessity underpinning the need to intervene they may find a more receptive audience.
6 It might be argued that we are over-controlling here, since party identification is likely to be at least partly causally posterior to personality factors like SDO and authoritarianism. That makes this a conservative test of the effects of those variables. Table 1 shows that, in terms of moral justifiability, we see that humanitarian interventions come fourth out of eight, although surprisingly behind preventative military action against states developing WMD.
However, in terms of effectiveness it comes sixth, with a large difference in those respondents who believe it to be justifiable and those that think it effective. While it is considered relatively justifiable it is also considered an ineffective policy, ahead only of democracy promotion and counter-terrorism. Public doubts about efficacy are equally clear if we move from rankings to ratings: the mean effectiveness of humanitarian intervention (3.62) is appreciably below the midpoint of the 1-7 scale, while mean justifiability is appreciably above that neutral point. In short, if the British public is resistant to a policy of humanitarian intervention, the qualms are more likely to be about whether the policy will work than about whether it is ethically sound. Admittedly, scepticism about effectiveness is not confined to humanitarian intervention Ð as Looking at psychological variables, we find that authoritarianism has no effect on perceptions of moral justification but Social Dominance Orientation does (B=.306 (p>0.01)). This is in line with H2a Ð RWAs do not perceive a direct threat in these situations and so are not predisposed to justify action Ð but not H3a, because we hypothesised that SDOs would be conflicted on this point. It seems that the national dominance element here Ð the SDO-driven perception that the UK has every right to intervene in the conduct of another country Ð outweighs any suspicion that humanitarian intervention is unjustifiable. Those suspicions, as we see below, seem to be more about whether intervention can and will work in a world where human rights abuses are inevitable. In all, attitudes towards normative justification appear thus to be driven not by threat perception but rather by a belief that Britain can act in any way it wants on the international stage.
The control variables also spell out significant factors that influence attitudes towards intervention and also suggest that political debate will be more influential on attitudes towards moral justification than towards effectiveness. First, we find that gender has an important effective on perceptions of justification but in a direction that contradicts previous research. Where previous studies have that men are more likely than women to support military intervention (Eichenberg 2003, Davies and Johns 2013) this study finds the opposite with women being more likely than men to believe that using military force to prevent a mass atrocity is morally justifiable (B=.389 (p>0.01)). This gender effect is present even when controlling for psychological processes (RWA and SDO) that would be expected to influence support for military action and potentially explain gender differences. The results point to a clear interaction between conflict type, gender and support for war Ð a finding that needs further investigation elsewhere. Next we need to investigate the impact of generational differences on perceptions of justification. We find that between the ages of 18-44 there is no discernable age effect, attitudes towards the justifiability of humanitarian intervention is broadly similar than the baseline group. However, from 45 onwards we observe much greater negativity towards the justifiability of humanitarian intervention. The 45-54 category is significantly less likely to think a humanitarian intervention is justifiable than the baseline 18-24 group (B=-1.50(p>0.01)). The same goes for the 55-64 group (B=-1.09 (p>0.01)) and the 65 plus bracket (-1.10 (p>0.01)). The older age groups appear to be far more cynical about the use of force and the normative justification for intervention, although as we shall discuss shortly these age differences are not found to affect perceptions about the effectiveness of military intervention. This age differential could be down to macrolearning process stemming from an event that the older generations were exposed to, but the younger ones were not, although this is clearly speculation. Looking at education, we see that the more educated the respondent the less likely they are to believe that humanitarian intervention can be morally justified (B=-.108 (p>0.01)). It appears that the better educated are more cynical about the ethical case for humanitarian intervention, a finding not replicated when examining effectiveness.
Next we examine party identification, finding that it is an important factor influencing support for military intervention. It appears that political parties may provide significant cues about the justifiability of military intervention. A government trying to generate public support for a humanitarian intervention, will look towards their electoral base to assess the domestic political risks and benefits associated with foreign adventures.
If their supporters are generally behind the use of military intervention it will be less politically risky and may even provide electoral benefits, and so the support of party identifiers will have a direct domestic impact on a particular governmentÕs will to intervene. Model I (justification) demonstrates that party identification does matter, in most cases reducing perceptions that humanitarian interventions are morally justifiable.
In comparison to non-identifiers, Conservatives are less likely to perceive that a humanitarian intervention is justifiable (B=-.645 (p>0.01)), which is a slightly stronger Examining the personality variables, we can see that a different set of psychological processes drives attitudes towards effectiveness as compared with justifiability. Where those higher on SDO are more likely to believe that the UK has a right to intervene, they are no more likely than low social dominants to believe that intervention will be effective. This null effect, contrary to our prediction in H3b, again perhaps reflects the cancelling of two drivers: first, SDOsÕ general belief in the effectiveness of military and other power-based solutions; second, their scepticism about the capacity of any solution, including military, to eliminate inevitable features of a competitive international system. Meanwhile, in line with H2b, we find a pronounced negative relationship between RWA and a belief in the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention (B=-.389 (p>0.01) ). This, we argue, is because authoritarian personality types see such action as exacerbating rather than mitigating risk in a threatening world.
As such, authoritarians are more prone to a kind of isolationism than are the more militant interventionism SDOs.
Even when controlling for personality traits, we still find that gender plays an important role in explaining perceptions of effectiveness (B=.590 (p>0.01)). The difference between the genders is greater in regards to perceptions of effectiveness than with perceptions of normative justification, with men being much more likely to perceive that humanitarian interventions are effective than women. The genders are a little closer in their attitude towards justification, with women being only slightly more inclined to believe that humanitarian interventions are morally acceptable, but they are much more likely than men to believe that humanitarian interventions will be effective. Now examining age differences, the model indicates that there is no real pattern emerge with only the 45-54 age group being less likely to think that humanitarian interventions are effective than the baseline 18-24 group (B=-.801 (p>0.01)). We are unable to posit a reason for the reluctance of this age group to believe that humanitarian interventions are effective, there may have been a formative event that particularly affected this groupÕs perception about humanitarian intervention, but again this is speculation. We also find Party Identification has little impact on perceptions of effectiveness, with only Liberal Democrat identifiers being more likely than nonidentifiers to believe that humanitarian interventions are effective (B=.382 (p>0.01)). If debates about a humanitarian intervention are based around effectiveness then party cues will be less influential than if the debate was based around justification. Finally, while education increases the scepticism about the justification of humanitarian intervention, there is no significant difference between the more and less educated. The general scepticism about the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention is not mediated through education, rather from a larger macro-level learning process. All respondents are generally unwilling to believe that humanitarian interventions are effective regardless of party identification and age. Overall, the models have demonstrated that there are significant differences in how individuals make decisions about the justifiability and efficacy of humanitarian interventions. The models provide some clarity to the factors that influence public attitudes towards humanitarian intervention, but they also open up some interesting avenues for future research. 
Implications and Conclusions
At the beginning of the paper we discussed the importance of public opinion in generating the political will to intervene to stop mass atrocities. We also highlighted a theoretical mechanism between democratic transparency, public opinion and the capacity to deter other states from abusing their own populations. Understanding support for humanitarian interventions is therefore vital in the quest to reduce human rights abuses and in the development of strategies to maximise public support for foreign intervention. This paper has looked at two perceptions that will ultimately affect public willingness to intervene: 1) of humanitarian intervention as morally justifiable and 2) of such interventions as effective in achieving their objectives. The processes involved making decisions about both of these dimensions are very different. The fact that attitudes towards justification were more easily explained in our regression models suggests that judgements about effectiveness are more situational and thus less easily accounted for by individualsÕ background characteristics and attitudes. The models also demonstrate that the psychological underpinnings of support for interventions are different depending on whether you are looking at justification or effectiveness. SDO, and the belief that the world is governed by the strong, drives a conviction that military action in general, including humanitarian intervention, is justified.
However, probably because of the perceived futility of trying to eliminate inevitable abuses, SDO does not convince of the effectiveness of such action. Meanwhile, although authoritarians are not opposed to military action per se, they are less convinced of the justification of humanitarian intervention and actually regard it as counterproductive. We suggest that this is because such action can only increase the threat to the self and nation that is key to RWA. That conjecture could be tested using a measure of isolationism which has been shown to correlate with authoritarianism (Cizmar et al. 2014 ).
Another useful avenue for more research is the gender gap. The finding that women are much more inclined to perceive humanitarian interventions as being both justifiable and effective seems to go against ample research finding men to be readier to support military intervention (Eichenberg 2003) . Both a more refined analysis of gender gaps across conflict types and a more detailed analysis of the psychological mediators of these gender effects would be useful.
The future of R2P requires a dialogue between elites and publics about the justifiability and effectiveness of humanitarian intervention. The public, who have to bear the costs in terms of both blood and treasure, are clearly sceptical and especially about the effectiveness of these interventions. If the British government wants to generate political will among its public, it will need to do more than to emphasize the ethical case for action. However, if the likeliest route to demonstrating effectiveness is through a successful intervention, and support from a reluctant public is a precondition for such intervention, the British government may face a Catch 22 situation for some time to come.
